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‘Discipline, comme tu saignes!’
—rené char
‘consequently, a true master [Meister] is at bottom only he who can 
provoke the other to transform himself through his act’.
—slavoj Žižek
i. the situation
our call for submissions to this issue read as follows:
to mark the english translation of L’Être et l’événement as Being and Event, the journal 
Cosmos and History will publish a special issue on the work of the philosopher 
alain Badiou. the approach of this journal is to publish work that goes beyond 
the merely exegetical and to this end we would like contributors to take up the 
challenge Badiou raises in Being and Event when he says:
the categories that this book deploys, from the pure multiple to the subject, 
constitute the general order of a thought such that it can be practised across the 
entirety of the contemporary system of reference. these categories are available 
for the service of scientific procedures just as they are for those of analysis or 
politics. they attempt to organize an abstract vision of the requirements of the 
epoch.
We invite contributors to this special issue to respond to Badiou’s challenge and 
deploy his categories in thinking a particular situation—be it political, artistic, 
scientific or amorous.
although it has taken nearly two decades for Being and Event to become available in 
english, there are already an enormous number of conferences, articles, translations, 
introductions and monographs dedicated to Badiou and his work (see the bibliography 
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in this edition of Cosmos and History). We find works of Badiou translated directly from 
the French editions (Deleuze, Ethics, Saint Paul, Metapolitics, Handbook of  Inaesthetics, Briefings 
on Existence, Manifesto for Philosophy, Being and Event); essays or extracts from existing 
publications, on a variety of matters (politics, art, etc.) and appearing in a range of 
journals (e.g., Diacritics, Art Forum, etc.); created or assembled works not appearing in 
such form (such as Infinite Thought, On Beckett or Theoretical Writings); new pieces written 
especially for translation (e.g., the many ‘author’s prefaces’ now available).
if one casts an eye over the existing commentries, they seem preponderantly to 
fall into a small number of significant categories. First, the introductions, ranging from 
the extended and well-informed monographs to shorter articles in specialist journals. 
second, the critiques, which tend to focus either on Badiou’s general tendencies, or on 
particular claims that he makes (e.g., Think Again, most of the essays in Communication 
and Cognition Vols. 36 & 37, and in Polygraph 7, etc.). third, the assimilation of Badiou’s 
terminology and themes into more general projects, as a kind of grab-bag of general 
concepts for use in varying situations. But what we were calling for was something a 
little different, a fourth way: a systematic deployment of Badiou’s categories. 
it’s not that this hasn’t been attempted. oliver Feltham, the english translator of 
Being and Event, and a contributor to the current issue of Cosmos and History, has done 
so in regard to a local australian political event in ‘singularity happening in politics: 
the aboriginal tent embassy, canberra 97’. But such an ‘application’ has been 
surprisingly rare, to the point where it seems people might appear chary of being 
mistaken for a merely uncritical disciple, dogmatist, or dinosaur. (it is noteworthy that 
such accusations have, in the anglophone world at least, been flung at ‘lacanians’, a 
state of affairs about which slavoj Žižek has often fulminated). it has been, as we have 
said, much more the case that critics have wanted to pose different questions, or try to 
get different things out of Badiou’s corpus to date.
ii. Masters & Disciples ≠ FrienDs & eneMies ≠ Fathers & sons
this brings up the rather boring relationship between a master’s writings, a systematic 
philosophy, discipleship and commentary. Badiou’s great treatise Being and Event has just 
become available in english, so the system-building volume at the base of his reputation 
will be accessible to a new audience. this adds to the already-existing books translated 
straight from the French, the anthologies composed of occasional writings, ‘exclusive’ 
interviews, and essays extracted from other volumes, all subjected to the exigencies of 
commodity-production, legal entitlement and bio-physical limitations. this situation—
hardly worth mentioning in itself, it may seem, simply the banal conditions of 
contemporary book marketing—should, on the contrary, force us to reappraise Badiou’s 
. in Communication & Cognition, vol. 37, nos. 3 &4, 004, pp. 5-45. see also Barbara Formis, ‘event and 
ready-made: Delayed sabotage’, in the same volume, pp. 47-6.
. For example, see the recent film Žižek!, in which our eponymous hero has a go at an off-screen decon-
structionist on precisely this point.
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own accounts of the dissemination of thought, philosophical thought. indeed, Badiou is 
undoubtedly one of the few contemporary philosophers to factor in the problem of the 
dissemination of thought into his thought itself.
a tiny article—which, to our knowledge, nobody in the anglophone world has yet 
translated, anthologized, or even adequately discussed—is crucial here. this article, 
entitled, ‘What is a philosophical institution? or: address, transmission, inscription’ can 
be found in Conditions.3 in this article of less than eight pages, Badiou elaborates an 
entire theory of the transmission of philosophy. Without an institution, no transmission; 
without transmission, no philosophy. how to think, however, this institution outside, first, 
established actualities such as the university which captured philosophy after Kant, and, 
second, without simply abstracting from or returning to classical forms of philosophical 
institution (the academy, the stoa, the Garden, etc.)? Moreover, how to think the role 
of the disciples or of the friends of philosophy? and so, third, how to avoid characterizing 
a philosophical institution in the religious terms—however admirable and radical—of a 
Quaker ‘society of friends’?
For Badiou, a philosophical institution can have no instrumental value, precisely 
because one can never apportion ends, aims or finalities to philosophy. philosophy 
must, despite its most stringent and rigorous conclusions, testify to what he calls ‘the 
interminable imperative of continuing’.
if philosophy itself institutes nothing but the void of an address, the transmission of a 
philosophy requires its disciples to invent new modes of thinking adequate to supporting 
the singularity of this empty address; these disciples work to transform the emergence 
of this void address into letters, into marks that subsist and can circulate along routes 
and through places that previously would have found these marks unthinkable and/or 
unacceptable. and these letters can only move as conflict, as antagonism, as committed 
incomprehension: a philosophical disciple doesn’t really know (though he or she may 
desperately want to know), and knows that, though he or she can never know they know, 
they must place their names and bodies behind the work of their own obscure enquiries. 
the disciple often demands that the master be the one, even as he poses the master 
the most infuriating problems, induces the master to cover himself further, to drape 
the possibility that the garment might gape to reveal…what? the nothing beneath?4 
Disciples must force something, illegitimately, into being. 
yet it is not publicity at which such disciples and institutions aim, but inscriptions, 
knotted, difficult, forever being done, undone, redone. it is only by such means that a 
philosophy becomes what it is—in transformed institutions by which it can encounter 
other philosophies. hence a philosophical institution ‘is not the guardian of philosophy, 
3. alain Badiou, Conditions, paris, seuil, 99, pp. 83-89. it has been translated for the first time into english 
by a. J. Bartlett for this issue of Cosmos and History, with Badiou’s permission.
4. see, for instance, Badiou’s ‘afterword’, subtitled ‘some replies to a demanding friend’, in peter hallward, 
(ed.), Think Again, london and new york, continuum, 004, pp. 3-37; and his ‘author’s preface’, to 
Theoretical Writings, ed. and trans. r. Brassier and a. toscano, london and new york, continuum, 004, 
pp. xiii-xv. 
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but of its historicity. it is thus the guardian of philosophies. it is the knotted plural of 
philosophies as resistance in time, which often means: resistance to the times’. it is in 
such institutions-in-process—‘truth-bodies’, perhaps, in the language of Badiou’s new 
book Logiques des mondes—that disciples read, translate, re-edit the texts of the master; 
squabble about the philosophy in question; relate it to classical problems in the history 
of thought; relate it to other philosophies; to the world as they find it transfigured in the 
unprecedented dark light of these new little letters, etc.
But, in what one might call this ‘adherence’ (we don’t use the word ‘fidelity’, for 
reasons which will become apparent) of the disciple—an adherence which does not, 
of course, preclude vicious and unforgiving attacks on their master’s texts—they can 
tend towards becoming policemen of the state of philosophy, the place in which all 
the elements of (a) philosophy, having been torn from their original situations, are 
turned into new sets, verified, legitimated, included. using the terms of Badiou’s own 
schematization of set-theory, one can say that disciples can end up doing the work of the 
state of philosophy, the transformation of what’s presented into representation, through 
their ceaseless unbinding, and re-countings of the philosopher’s words. in this sense, 
the operations of disciples can be schematized by the power-set and union operations 
of set-theory; if disciples are the source of philosophy’s growth and dissemination, they 
are also potential agents of its ‘statification’. the putative universality of philosophy must 
always run the risk of the state. 
yet, in his ‘author’s preface’ to Theoretical Writings, Badiou seems to modify the 
position of ‘What is a philosophical institution?’
[i]n what sense can this present book really be said to be one of my books? 
specifically, one of my books of philosophy? is it not rather a book by my friends 
ray Brassier and alberto toscano? after all, they gathered and selected the texts 
from several different books, which for the most part were not strictly speaking 
‘works’ but rather collections of essays (xiv).
if the question of forms of  writing is critical in this context, it is because a philosophical 
institution must always bind itself to the singularity of a philosopher’s dicta, and it is thus 
no accident that Badiou himself is very attentive to such a necessity. each philosopher 
invents or constructs his or her own form (and the aforementioned ‘preface’ accordingly 
opens with a list of major philosophical forms). We want to suggest that, although 
Badiou is a systematic philosopher, his own system is one that complicates the difference 
between ‘central works’ and ‘occasional essays’. certainly, his major works to date are 
Being and Event and, now, the just-released Logiques des mondes. yet, as Badiou put it in a 
recent talk in Melbourne, these books are like ‘atomic bombs’, quite useless as effective 
weaponry in themselves. it is their mere existence, or, rather, the ongoing research that 
produced them, that supports the truly engaged and effective interventions evident in 
the shorter books, articles and interviews. 
philosophy would be nothing without its masters; yet a master requires disciples to be 
a master at all. recently, Badiou has started to refer explicitly to this work of discipleship 
under the rubric of ‘friendship’, a very interesting nominal shift. if it’s probably a bit 
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rich (presumptuous?) for a living philosopher to refer to his living disciples as disciples, 
and if the rubric of ‘friendship’ itself has an impeccable philosophical pedigree, this 
nonetheless opens a question as to the true subjects of thought. in fact, we detect a 
double division here within Badiou’s thinking of an institution: the division between 
master and disciples, on the one hand, and between friends and enemies, on the other. Both 
are to be distinguished from fathers and sons (and not only for the sexist implications of 
the latter).
this, however, suggests another way of thinking about the relation between master and 
disciple, a wavering and uncertain line of division within philosophy and its institutions.5 
some indications: ) the difference between ‘friends’ and ‘disciples’; ) the difference 
between ‘philosophy’ and ‘history of philosophy’; 3) the difference between ‘situation’ 
and ‘state’; 4) the difference between ‘forms of writing’ and their ‘re-presentation’. after 
all, for Badiou, the very exemplum of a subject engaged in a militant fidelity to an event 
is saint paul, the greatest of all ‘disciples’, the one who invents the first known universal 
institution in human history. it is not christ who is the hero of subjectivity for Badiou, 
but paul. on the other hand, as Badiou notes, explicating st. paul: ‘philosophy knows 
only disciples. But a son-subject is the opposite of a disciple-subject, because he is one 
whose life is beginning’.6 the problem here is, then, the relation between ‘disciples’ and 
‘friends’.
since, as Badiou insists at the beginning of Being and Event, a contemporary 
philosophy must circulate between ontology, modern inventions of subjectivity and its 
own history, the disciples and their work must be treated as integral to the elaboration of  philosophy 
itself. a philosophy must attend to the problem of its own institution, to philosophical 
institutions, to the creation of new forms of institution. it must attend to the problem of 
friends and disciples. Following this mobile line takes us directly to questions at the heart 
of Badiou’s philosophy, to his refashioned concept of praxis. 
iii. the concept oF praxis
For Badiou, we say, praxis composes a knot: it is simultaneously thought, act and 
category. the subject, a category that can be deployed ‘across the entirety of the 
contemporary system of reference’, does the work of tying and retying the strands of 
thought and act. the subject, whose being is void, constitutes in and as itself the locus of 
praxis which brings ‘thought and being’ together under the injunction of the same. the 
subject is what it is to think and to be at the same time—the ‘junction of a disjunction’. 
praxis is in the service of scientific procedures, artistic configurations, emancipatory 
politics and love. But as the knot constituted of categories, concepts and acts, praxis is in 
no way the predicate of the functioning of this knot nor the determinant of the existence 
5. this immanent division seems to be borne out by Badiou himself when in ‘What is a philosophical insti-
tution?’ he suggests that ‘in the circumstances of writing, the master makes a disciple of himself ’, p. 87.
6. alain Badiou, Saint Paul: The Foundation of  Universalism, trans. ray Brassier, stanford, stanford university 
press, 003, p. 59.
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of its strands. rather, these three strands of the knot demand both their compossibility 
and their name. praxis is the composition of, and the name for, the service of the subject 
whose procedure will have been decided by the situation. this situation (all situations 
being founded through the event) is that which endures despite the attentive recounting 
of what it counts by the state. it is the situation then which ‘decides’ the praxiological 
conditions for the subject. or, to put it another way, the situation decides, qua situation, 
for which procedure the category of the subject is the contingent and finite support. 
like walking slowly, praxis, for the Greeks, was the privilege of ‘free men’. Marx 
considered praxis in a similar way, though perhaps not as the privilege of free men 
but more as that which both constituted and supported man as free. so our knot knots 
together thought and act, the category of the subject, the situation for which this subject 
is subject, and the free man in the temporality of the future anterior. But what is a ‘free 
man’? it is certainly not a subject; and yet it most certainly is. the trivial yet compulsive 
liberal definition of freedom attests only to a limitless dispersal, a casting off of all that is 
not ‘the free man’—the (therefore) sovereign individual. the individual always knows ‘that 
which it is not’—and by extension ‘what must not be’—which is why it is sovereign. in 
passing we can see that ‘deciding for the exception’ is a banal rather than exceptional 
concept. the subject, our subject is, as we can see, subject to the discipline—the cruel 
discipline—of certain conditions: the pure multiple, the event, the situation, the practice 
of the procedures and their sustaining under the category of the ‘same’ or truth. ‘our’ 
free man, which is to say man as free, is in truth a subject, whereas ‘the individual, in 
truth, is nothing’. the subject ‘knows’ nothing, in the liberal sense of the word. rather, 
the subject is the extent of its enquiries conditioned absolutely by its conditions. it has 
no knowledge to speak of. it is not a bridge between predicate and end, just as justice is 
not located at the ‘end of a state program’. praxis, we can say, knows no ends. its being 
is infinite and the truth for which it is the support is likewise eternal. 
so why praxis? perhaps symptomatically, we have not yet mentioned that category 
which is critical to any praxis today, that of courage. What does this courage amount to? 
it amounts to continuing. courage is the courage to continue in praxis, to act to sustain 
and extend any series of situated enquiries across the entirety of a situation—a situation 
that knows no end. to be a subject is to be the courageous support of a truth. it is 
through the courage of the subject that the thought of truth is given being as a thought-
practice. as such, courage amounts to the practice of thought. and a ‘thought is nothing 
other than the desire to have done with the exorbitant excesses of the state’. praxis is 
thus the courageous work of a free man under the condition of a truth against the state. 
above all, praxis is a name for risk. it is a throw of the dice by those who are nothing, 
but chance to be everything.
iV. in this issue
one must beware the sirens yearning to lure the philosophic voyager onto the rocks, 
even if one is a Mallarméan and finds that sirens have considerable poetic appeal. the 
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articles collected in this special issue certainly attempt to avoid this deleterious end, 
whether through lashing themselves to the mast(er), or through plugging their ears with 
wax. here then, without revision-ing summary or summarily re-presenting, we present 
the names of those who have practiced-thought in response to our call: a. J. Bartlett, 
lorenzo chiesa, oliver Feltham, Zachary Fraser, sam Gillespie, lindsey hair, alex 
ling, toula nicolacopoulos and George Vassilacopoulos, nina power, Brian anthony 
smith and alberto toscano. We also thank alain Badiou for permission to publish the 
essential article from Conditions. 
in addition to the articles we have also attempted to review as many of Badiou’s 
books in english as possible. in addition to a long review article by Justin clemens on 
Logiques des mondes, we also include Jon roffe on Being and Event, Mairéad phillips on 
Metapolitics, Graham storey on On Beckett, a. J. Bartlett on Briefings on Existence, alex ling 
on Ethics, Mark hewson on Infinite Thought, chris van rompaey on Think Again, liam 
o’Donnell on St Paul, as well as elizabeth newman reviewing a collection of essays 
on Jacques Lacan and the Other Side of  Psychoanalysis. We also include a comprehensive 
bibliography compiled by paul ashton.
and—on the basis that no platonist can be allowed to escape into ideas entirely 
unscathed by poetry—we have included a poem by Dominique hecq, entitled 
‘follysophy’, which responds directly to Badiou’s work.
if one must be an activist (a ‘militant’) in a truth process, the creation of a philosophical 
system is itself a protracted act—and this act itself is something that scrambles the polarities 
of closed and open, centre and margins, structure and occasion, continuation and 
punctuation. as Badiou notes early in Saint Paul, the hostility of the contemporary world 
to philosophy is evident in the repression of the very names of philosophy’s conditions. 
thus ‘culture’ obliterates ‘art’, ‘technology’ obliterates ‘science’, ‘management’ obliterates 
‘politics’, and ‘sexuality’ obliterates ‘love’: ‘the system: culture-technics-management-
sexuality—that has the immense merit of being homogenous to the market, and of 
which all the terms, at least, designate a rubric of commercial presentation—is the 
nominal modern recovery of the system art-science-politics-love…’ 7 
thus the unavowed system of anti-systematic thought is in some way homogeneous 
with the system of the times; declarative systematic thought (philosophy), as we said 
above, attempts to rupture with the system of the times. or, again, the latter attempts to 
take account of the thoughts that do attempt such a rupture (the four conditions). thus 
‘system’ is integral to philosophy. not every system is philosophical, of course, but every 
philosophy, every true philosophy, must aim at systematicity. hence the importance 
of the ‘and’ in the title of Being and Event; ‘and’ is precisely the philosophical injunction, 
the injunction of system. Chez Badiou, being is dealt with by mathematics, while events 
are the province of the conditions. neither are, strictly speaking, the proper job of 
philosophy. What philosophy must do is construct a way of bridging the gap without 
reduction. philosophy is the ampersand composing a discourse of, if we may, cosmos and 
7. Badiou, Saint Paul, p. 3.
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history.
But let there be no confusion: there can be no simple opposition between a ‘closed’ 
system and an ‘open’ becoming. Whether covertly moralized or not, such denominations 
are insufficient to treat the novelty of a philosophical system in act. Badiou’s system is 
produced in an endless circulation through the conditions, returning to them again 
and again, in different forms (extended treatises, handbooks, articles, oral presentations, 
etc.), constantly permitting them to norm and re-divert existing propositions of his 
philosophy.
it thus seems to us that there is no principled difference between the ‘original’ 
‘meditations’ of and in Being and Event and the varied articles re-collected in other 
volumes and other languages: all are part of the ongoing act of  system, whether or not 
Badiou himself actually envisaged these articles one day sitting together in an english 
translation. this act is novelty itself, insofar as no existing names or concepts are 
adequate to capturing the shape or rhythm of its elaboration. this system-act, integral 
to the definition of philosophy, is what tries to validate the contemporary compossibility 
of philosophy’s conditions—that is, their heterogeneous sheltering, a void peace of their 
discontinuity.
in other words, there is no philosophical system without disciples, or, at least, a 
seething and active host of bizarre patchwork creatures traversed by the mobile line of 
the friend-disciple division. if they can get it together, knotting inscriptions against the 
tendency to representation, a new philosophical institution may well emerge. to parody 
the jingle from the popular australian soap-opera Neighbours—with all the horror that 
the very word and concept may conjure up—that’s when good disciples become good friends.
We would therefore like to thank our contributors for their dedication and their 
courage, through which, to again quote Badiou in Melbourne in 006: ‘finally, we have 
always to become the contrary of our masters’.
paul ashton 
Victoria & latrobe university 
a. J. Bartlett 
Deakin university 
and 
Justin clemens 
Deakin university
